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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that ethnic divisions or diversity in a society leads to negative
outcomes in various dimensions, including civil conict and economic development. It is often
argued that the lack of shared social identity, that is, the dominance of subnational (particularly,
ethnic) identities over national identity, lies behind the negative outcomes in ethnically heterogenous
societies. If shared national identity is important, how can it be realized? In political science, there
exist conicting theses emphasizing e¤ects of modernization on national identity. Which thesis
is more relevant under what conditions? How are conict and output a¤ected by modernization
through identity? How do policies such as "nation-building" policies a¤ect the outcome?
In order to examine these questions theoretically, this paper develops a model of social identity,
ethnic conict, and development. In the model, individuals choose a sector to work (between
the modern sector and a traditional sector), social identity (between ethnic identity and national
identity), and contributions to ethnic conict. Thus, modernization (and output), identity, and
conict interact with each other.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that ethnic divisions or diversity in a society leads to negative outcomes
in various dimensions, including internal armed conict (Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray, 2012), public
goods provision (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), and economic development (Montalvo and Reynal-
Quero, 2005) among others.1 It is often argued that the lack of shared social identity, that is,
the dominance of subnational (particularly, ethnic) identities over national identity, lies behind the
negative outcomes in ethnically heterogenous societies (Collier, 2009).
If shared national identity is important, how can it be realized? Miguel (2004) and Collier
(2009), based on case study and statistical analysis, argue that "nation-building" policies, such as
the promotion of a national language and school education emphasizing common history, culture,
and values, are e¤ective in strengthening national identity.2 Meanwhile, in political science, there
exist competing theses emphasizing roles of modernization (including industrialization, the rise of
wage labor, the di¤usion of education, and urbanization) on national identity (see Robinson, 2014,
for an overview). The traditional thesis, based on the past experience of Europe, is that moderniza-
tion leads to widespread national identity at the expense of ethnic and other subnational identities
(Deutsch, 1953; Weber, 1979; Gellner, 1983). By contrast, based on post-independent experience of
Africa, another inuential thesis argues that modernization rather breeds ethnic identication due
to intensied competition over resources (Melson and Wolpe, 1970; Bates, 1983).3 If the traditional
view is correct, policies promoting modernization might be more important than "nation-building"
policies for shared national identity and good outcomes in conict and development, while if the
competing view is true, nation-building policies would be critical. Both hypotheses would contain
some truth, but which is more relevant under what conditions? How are conict and output af-
fected by modernization through identity? How do policies such as "nation-building" policies a¤ect
the outcomes?
In order to examine these questions theoretically, this paper develops a model of social identity,
ethnic conict, and economic development. In the model, which builds on the model of social
identication and ethnic conict by Sambanis and Shayo (2013), individuals choose a sector to
1Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012), employing a specication based on Esteban and Ray (2011) and cross-country
data, nd that three indices of ethnic divisions, polarization, fractionalization, and the Gini-Greenberg index, are
signicantly (positively for the rst two indices, negatively for the last one) related to conict. Miguel and Gugerty
(2005) show that fractionalization is negatively related to school funding and school infrastructure quality in two
districts of rural Kenya. Montalvo and Reynal-Quero (2005), using cross-country data, nd the evidence suggesting
that polarization has a negative e¤ect on economic growth through its negative e¤ect on investment and positive
e¤ects on government consumption and civil conict and fractionalization has a direct negative e¤ect on growth.
2Miguel (2004) nds that two neighboring rural districts of Tanzania and Kenya, which largely shared geography,
history, and colonial institutional legacy, exhibit a sharp di¤erence in the relationship between ethnic diversity and
local provision of public goods (school funds and infrastructures), negative and signicant for the Kenyan district
and positive and insignicant for the Tanzanian district. He also nds that the relationship is insignicant for other
local public nance outcomes for Tanzania (no comparable data for Kenya). He argues that sharply di¤erent ethnic
policies in areas such as national language and public school education of post-independent governments contributed
to di¤erences in the strength of national identity and the above-mentioned relationship of the two countries.
3There is the third view focusing on Africa that also denies the traditional view based on much higher degrees of
ethnic diversity of African nations than European nations (Kedourie, 1970; Davidson, 1992). This view also stresses
important roles colonial legacy plays in todays social identity in Africa.
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work (between the modern sector and a traditional sector), social identity (between ethnic and
national identities), and contributions to conict. Thus, modernization (and output), identity, and
conict interact with each other.
Model: The analysis is based on a contest model (Hirshleifer, 1989; Garnkel, 1990; and
Skaperdas, 1992) in which multiple ethnic groups contest for exogenous resources. A nite number
of individuals belong to one of the ethnic groups that are symmetric in every aspect. So the model
is concerned with an ethnically heterogenous society without a dominant ethnic group.
There are multiple sectors producing the private good, ethnically-segregated traditional sectors
and the integrated modern sector. The traditional sectors correspond to sectors using traditional
or primitive technologies in the real economy, such as traditional agriculture, the urban informal
sector, and household production, and the modern sector corresponds to sectors using modern tech-
nologies such as modern manufacturing and services; and the former sectors or activities tend to
be more ethnically segregated than the latter: traditional agriculture is operated in rural commu-
nities and typical jobs in the urban informal sector are neighborhood jobs in ethnically segregated
communities. The production technology of the modern sector exhibits constant returns to its only
input, labor, and the wage is determined competitively, whereas, as in many existing works, that
of traditional sectors exhibits decreasing returns to labor and the wage is determined so that the
product is equally shared among workers.4 This setting can generate, in a simplest manner, the
situation facing actual developing countries that there are ine¢ ciently many workers in traditional
sectors and their shift to the modern sector raises aggregate output.
The ethnic groups contest for exogenous resources that yield group-specic club goods, such
as public services and infrastructures beneting a specic group.5 The proportion of the resources
a particular group acquires equals the proportion of contributions to conict by members of the
group. The individual cost of conict increases with the amount of contribution or "e¤orts" an
individual makes, and, as in standard contest models, the level of conict is measured by the total
"e¤orts" in the society. The resources represent both material resources (such as natural resources)
and a part of the governmental budget used for producing the group-specic goods. The model
considers the situation in which the resource allocation over the groups is determined not by rules
but by the consequences of violent conict or non-violent conict (such as rent-seeking activities).
As in Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the utility of an individual depends not only on (i) his
material payo¤, which is the wage minus the cost of conict plus the benet from the group-specic
club good, but also negatively on (iii) perceived distance from a social group he identies with (his
ethnic group or the nation) and positively on (iii) the status of the social group, which are important
factors a¤ecting social identication and intergroup behaviors, according to inuential theories in
4The technology of traditional sectors intends to capture the fact that labor productivity tends to fall with
the amount of labor input due to limited arable land (traditional agriculture), limited capital available to credit
constrained producers (urban informal sector), or a decreasing degree of task specialization of each family member
(household production). The wage determination rule reects the fact that typical production units are family-run
farms/rms or households. Except results on output, qualitative results do not depend on the latter assumption.
5Main results are unchanged when the contested resources yield the private good. But the assumption that the
resources yield group-specic club goods justies more naturally the setting that conict arises among ethnic groups.
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social psychology.6 He perceives how close to or far from a social group with the distance between
his attributes and average attributes of the group. The attributes are whether one belongs to (a)
the nation or not, (b) particular ethnic groups or not, and (c) particular traditional sectors or not.
Following Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the weight on the ethnic attributes (national attribute)
in the distance is assumed to be increasing (decreasing) in the level of conict, which implies
that, when conict becomes more intense, people care about ethnicity more (nationality less) in
measuring distances from social groups. The status of a social group is given by the exogenous
di¤erence between the groups "value" or "importance" and that of reference or comparison groups
(other nations when the group is the nation). The national status, for example, represents peoples
evaluations of the nations standing or reputation, particularly compared to neighboring nations,
in "soft" dimensions including culture, history, sports, and widely shared values (such as human
rights and democracy) as well as in "hard" dimensions such as military strength and territory.
The utility function implies that, given that an individual identies with a particular social
group, his utility increases as the perceived distance from the group decreases. Since the distance
depends on di¤erences in the sectoral attributes, others things equal, he has an incentive to choose
the same sector as the "average person" of the group. Coordinating the choice among group mem-
bers has positive externality on each others utility. However, social identication of an individual
is not xed. He can "choose" a group (his ethnic group or the nation) that brings him higher utility
either because of higher material payo¤, the shorter perceived distance, or the higher status.7 His
identity might change if exogenous variables a¤ecting his utility or choices by others alter. For
example, as the level of conict rises, individuals place a greater (smaller) weight on the ethnic
attributes (national attribute) in the perceived distance, which could change their identities.8
Individuals play a two-stage game to maximize their utility. First, they decide which sector to
work, which determines labor incomes and sectoral and aggregate production. Then, they choose
a social group to identify with and a contribution to conict simultaneously, which determines the
level of conict, the allocation of the resources over the groups, and individual utilities.
Results: Equilibria can be classied into two types, those in which individuals of the same
ethnic group share the same identity and those they do not.9 There exist two homogenous identity
equilibria: the one in which all individuals identify with their ethnic group and the one in which all
identify with the nation. And there exist three heterogenous identity equilibria: the one in which
6The concept of perceived distance is the basis of a major social psychological theory, self-categorization theory
(Turner et al., 1987). Intergroup status di¤erences are major factors a¤ecting intergroup behaviors such as conict
and discrimination, according to another inuential theory, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).
7There is considerable evidence suggesting that perceived distance and status a¤ect social identity. For example,
Manning and Roy (2010) nd, for Great Britain, that nonwhite individuals, whose perceived distance from the nation
seems to be greater, are less likely to think of themselves as British than whites. Further, they nd that immigrants
from poorer and less democratic (that is, lower status) countries assimilate faster into British identity.
8Evidence suggests that peoples identities are a¤ected by the intensity of conict. For example, Rohner, Thoenig,
and Zilibotti (2013), using individual, county-level and district-level data from Uganda, nd that the proportion of
those identifying with their ethnic group over the nation is higher in counties of the higher intensity of armed conicts,
after controlling for individual, ethnic, and spatial characteristics and employing instrumental variable estimation.
9As mentioned above, ethnic groups are assumed to be symmetric in every aspect. Hence, the paper focuses on
equilibria in which choices of all groups are symmetric. Most of asymmetric equilibria are very di¢ cult to analyze.
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those in the modern sector (traditional sectors) identify with the nation (their group); the one in
which those in the modern sector are divided over identities and all in traditional sectors identify
with their group; and the one in which those in traditional sectors are divided over identities
(and all in the modern sector identify with the nation): Thus, modern sector workers are more
(less) likely to identify with the nation (their ethnic group) than traditional sector workers. The
result is consistent with Robinson (2014), who, using individual-level survey data of sixteen African
countries, nds that being employed in the modern sector is signicantly and robustly associated
with identifying with the nation above their ethnic group, after controlling for education, urban
residence, gender, and various group-level and country-level variables.
When the equilibria are compared for given parameters and exogenous variables, it is found that
the level of conict is lower, the share of modern sector workers is higher, and, under conditions
that would hold for typical developing countries, total output of the private good and aggregate
material payo¤ are higher, when the proportion of individuals identifying with the nation is higher.
That is, national identity is associated with not only the lower level of ethnic conict, which is
shown in Sambanis and Shayo (2013), but also the higher modern sector share and higher output.
While the previous comparison is made for given parameters and exogenous variables, which
equilibrium(a) exist(s) changes with their values. A simple dynamics is introduced into the model
by supposing that one of exogenous variables, the (total factor) productivity of the modern sector,
increases over time. The productivity growth raises the modern sector wage, induces the higher
proportion of workers to choose the sector, and raises the sectors share in production. How does
such modernization of the economy a¤ect social identity, conict, and aggregate output?
If the national status is at extremes, the society stays in the same equilibrium: when the
status is very high (very low), all individuals always identify with the nation (their ethnic group)
and the level of conict is consistently low (high): Otherwise, when the status is relatively high
(low), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous identity equilibrium, in which traditional
sector workers are more likely to identify with their ethnic group than modern sector workers,
to the one in which all workers identify with the nation (their ethnic group) and the level of
conict is low (high). The sectoral shift of workers associated with modernization shakes social
identities in both sectors: modern sector workers become less attached to the national identity and
traditional sector workers become less attached to the ethnic identity. When the status is relatively
high (low), the e¤ect on traditional (modern) sector workers determines the equilibrium shift and
all become identied with the nation (their group). Although the productivity increase always
raises the modern sectors share in production and employment, given the productivity level, the
society tends to be in an equilibrium characterized by large (small) modern sector shares and,
under conditions that would hold for typical developing nations, high (low) aggregate output (and
aggregate material payo¤); when the status is high (low). That is, having su¢ ciently high national
status is crucial in achieving universal national identity, a low level of conict, high modern sector
shares (a high degree of modernization), and high aggregate output in the long run.
However, history or "luck" too is important, as long as the status is not at extremes. Given
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parameters and exogenous variables including the status, multiple equilibria tend to exist and thus
identity, conict, and output di¤er depending on which equilibrium is realized. Suppose that an
equilibrium realized initially is maintained in subsequent periods (if it continues to exist). Then, if
the initial equilibrium happens to be such that a relatively high proportion of individuals identify
with the nation, the society tends to be in an equilibrium with relatively strong national identity
and relatively good conditions in other dimensions subsequently.
Similar results hold for contested resources too when "low (high) status" of the above result is
replaced with "large (small) amount of resources". Specically, given the status, when the amount
of resources is large (small), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous identity equilibrium
to the one in which all individuals identify with their ethnic group (the nation). Note that the
contested resources represent both material resources (such as natural resources) and a part of the
governmental budget for group-specic goods whose allocation over the groups is determined by the
consequences of violent or non-violent conict. Hence, the result suggests that weak political and
economic institutions as well as the abundance of material resources is a hindrance to the good
outcomes. Further, an exogenous change making common nationality more salient (and ethnic
di¤erences less salient) in the perceived distance too has e¤ects similar to an increase in the status.
The results are consistent with the traditional thesis on e¤ects of modernization on social
identity, if the national status is high, contested resources are not abundant, institutions are good
in quality, or common nationality is valued (and ethnic di¤erences are not valued), otherwise, they
are consistent with the competing thesis, as far as the relatively long term e¤ect is concerned.
In the latter case, policies improving institutional quality, raising the national status, or making
shared nationality more salient (and ethnic di¤erences less salient) in peoples minds are crucial for
good outcomes.10 As mentioned above, Miguel (2004) and Collier (2009), based on case study and
statistical analysis, argue that "nation-building" policies, including the promotion of a national
language and school education emphasizing common history, culture, and values, are e¤ective in
strengthening national identity. The model shows how these policies can reinforce national identity
through raising the national status or making shared nationality more salient. There are empirical
works suggesting negative e¤ects of natural resources on civil conict and development and works
suggesting important e¤ects of political and economic institutions on civil conict, rent-seeking
activities, and development. The model reveals a novel mechanism interacting with social identity
that resources and institutions a¤ect ethnic conict and development.
Related literature: This paper belongs to the literature examining issues on ethnic conicts
using contest models. Recent contributions include Esteban and Ray (2008, 2011), Besley and
Persson (2010, 2011), Caselli and Coleman (2013), and Sambanis and Shayo (2013). Most closely
related is Sambanis and Shayo (2013), who develop the rst formal model of social identication
and ethnic conict using a utility function inspired by theories in social psychology. This paper
10As mentioned above, the national status represents peoples evaluations of its international standing or reputation,
particularly compared to neighboring nations, in "soft" dimensions such as culture, history, sports, and widely shared
values and in "hard" dimensions such as military strength and territory. Clearly, policies can a¤ect some of them.
5
extends their model by modeling multiple production sectors and associated sectoral choices by
workers (and production decisions of rms), in order to examine interactions among moderniza-
tion, identity, conict, and output. Besley and Persson (2010) also examines the relation between
conict and development but in connection with capacities of the state to raise revenue and provide
services supporting markets. Esteban and Ray (2008) develop a theory explaining the reason why
ethnic conict, rather than class conict, is salient, especially in societies with distinct economic
inequalities. Caselli and Coleman (2013) provide a theory of the salience of ethnic conict from
a di¤erent perspective. Besley and Persson (2011) examine conditions under which civil war and
repression by a group holding power on the opposition group occur. Esteban and Ray (2011) con-
struct a model that precisely connects the level of conict with three measures of ethnic divisions.
The paper also belongs to the literature examining interactions between identity and economic
behaviors, including Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010), Shayo (2009), Benabou and Tirole (2011),
and Bisin et al. (2011). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) pioneer formally modeling and examining
e¤ects of identity on economic behaviors and Akerlof and Kranton (2010) illustrate how various
behaviors can be explained by their framework. Shayo (2009) constructs the basic framework on
which Sambanis and Shayo (2013) and this paper are based by generalizing the framework of Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) and applies it to examine the political economy of income redistribution.
Benbou and Tirole (2011) develop a general model of identity management, applicable to both
personal and social identities, in which individuals who are uncertain about self-concept make
investment in identities, and provide explanations for wide-ranging empirical puzzles. Bisin et al.
(2011) develop a dynamic model of identity formation in which children of a minority group receive
an identity trait (either mainstream, i.e. accept the values of the majority, or oppositional)
from parents or role models and decide the intensity with which they identify with the trait.
Finally, the paper is also related to the literature that theoretically examines the modernization
of an economy, such as Lewis (1954), Banerjee and Newman (1998), Proto (2007), Vollrath (2009),
and Yuki (2007, 2008, 2014). In order to examine interactions among modernization, conict, and
social identication with a tractable model, this paper models the ine¢ cient sectoral allocation
of workers in a simplest manner and considers modernization induced by exogenous productivity
growth. By contrast, these papers model factors leading to the ine¢ cient allocation more explicitly
and examine economic mechanisms of modernization more in detail.
Organization of the paper: Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 presents and dis-
cusses results. In particular, Sections 3.1 and 3.2 examine homogenous and heterogeneous identity
equilibria respectively, Section 3.3 analyzes interactions among modernization, identity, conict,
and output, and Section 3.4 analyzes e¤ects of resources on the interactions. Section 4 concludes.
Appendix A presents existence conditions for equilibria, and Appendix B contains proofs.
2 Model
Consider a contest model (Hirshleifer, 1989; Garnkel, 1990; and Skaperdas, 1992) in which ne( 2)
ethnic groups contest for exogenous resources. The society is populated by a nite number N of
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individuals who belong to one of the ethnic groups that are symmetric in every aspect (thus the
population size of each group is N=ne). So the model is concerned with an ethnically heterogenous
society without a dominant ethnic group.
Production: There are ne + 1 sectors producing the private good, ne ethnically-segregated
traditional sectors TJ (J = 1; 2; :::; ne) and the ethnically-integrated modern sector M . The tradi-
tional sectors correspond to sectors using traditional or primitive technologies in the real economy,
such as traditional agriculture, the urban informal sector, and household production, and the mod-
ern sector corresponds to sectors using modern technologies such as modern manufacturing and
services;11 and the former sectors or activities tend to be more ethnically segregated than the lat-
ter: traditional agriculture is operated in rural communities and typical jobs in the urban informal
sector are neighborhood jobs in ethnically segregated communities.
The production functions of sectors TJ (J = 1; 2; :::; ne) and M are
YTJ = AT (LTJ)
;  2 (0; 1); (1)
YM = AM
neP
J=1
LMJ ; (2)
where LTJ and AT are respectively the number of workers in sector TJ and the sectors total factor
productivity (TFP), LMJ is the number of workers of ethnic group J in sector M; and AM is the
sectors TFP. (Each worker supplies a unit of labor inelastically.) Sector TJ exhibits decreasing
returns to labor, which intends to capture the fact that labor productivity tends to fall with the
amount of labor input in traditional sectors due to limited arable land (traditional agriculture),
limited capital available to credit constrained producers (the urban informal sector), or a decreasing
degree of task specialization of each family member (household production).12
The wage rate is determined competitively in sector M: By contrast, in sector TJ , as in Lewis
(1954) and many subsequent works modeling traditional sectors, labor income is determined so
that the product is equally shared among workers.13 Thus, labor incomes in the sectors are
yTJ = AT (LTJ)
 1; (3)
yM = AM : (4)
This setting can generate, in a simplest manner, the situation facing actual developing countries
that there are ine¢ ciently many workers in traditional sectors and their shift to the modern sector
11The urban informal sector is a part of the urban economy composed of small-scale businesses supplying basic
services (small shops and vendors selling commodities and meals are clear examples) and basic manufacturing goods.
Even today, sectors or production activities using traditional technologies is important in most developing nations.
Although urbanization lowered the share of agricultural employment signicantly, it did not raise the share of sectors
using modern technologies greatly in many countries. According to OECD (2009), informal employment, dened as
the sum of urban informal-sector employment and formal-sector one without social protection (such as social security
benets) accounts for the majority of non-agricultural employment in developing nations.
12This is because the number of tasks performed by each family member increases as more production activities
shift from the market to the household.
13This assumption reects the fact that typical production units of traditional sectors are family-run farms/rms
or households. Except results on total output of the private good, qualitative results below do not depend on this.
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raises aggregate output.14
Conict: The ethnic groups contest for exogenous resources that yield group-specic club
goods of value V , such as public services and infrastructures beneting a particular group.15 The
amount of resources each group acquires depends on contributions to the conict by individuals of
each group. In particular, the contested resources are divided among the groups according to the
following contest function,
VJ
V
=
FJ
F
if F > 0; and =
1
ne
if F = 0; (5)
where VJ is the resources acquired by group J(J = 1; 2; :::; ne), FJ =
P
i2J fi is the total contribu-
tions or "e¤orts" by members of the group (fi is the contribution by individual i), and F =
neP
J=1
FJ
is the aggregate "e¤orts" of the society, which is called the level of conict.16 The contested
resources represent both material resources (such as natural resources) and a part of the govern-
mental budget used for producing the group-specic goods. The model considers the situation in
which the resource allocation over the groups is determined not by rules but by the consequences
of violent conict or non-violent conict (such as rent-seeking activities), in which force, mass
demonstrations, bribery, or lobbying are employed to inuence the outcome.
Individual i contributing fi to the conict incurs a cost of c(fi), which, following Esteban and
Ray (2011), takes the following form:
c(fi) =
1

(fi)
;   2: (6)
The restriction   2 is needed to prove some results ( > 1 is enough for most results).
Utility: As in Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the utility of an individual depends not only
on his material payo¤ positively, but also negatively on perceived distance from a social group he
identies with (either his ethnic group or the nation) and positively on the status of the social group,
which are important factors a¤ecting social identication and intergroup behaviors, according to
inuential theories in social psychology.
The material payo¤ of individual i of ethnic group J (J = 1; 2; :::; ne) when he works in sector
K (K = TJ;M) is
i = yK   1

(fi)
 + 
FJ
F
V; (7)
where  is the value of the group-specic club good in units of the private good.
14 In the real economy, there are other factors causing the ine¢ cient allocation of workers, including inadequate
access to quality education required in many modern sector jobs and inadequate access to capital to start a business
in the sector. To make the model analytically tractable, these factors are not modeled but would not a¤ect results.
15Main results are unchanged when the contested resources yield the private good. But the assumption that the
resources yield group-specic club goods justies more naturally the setting that conict arises among ethnic groups.
Note, however, that theories by Esteban and Ray (2008) and Caselli and Coleman (2013) provide explanations for
the salience of ethnic conict in the real society even when groups contest for private goods.
16As may be inferred from the setting, conict always occurs in equilibrium. The paper does not examine the
question of why costly and sometimes destructive conict ever occurs at all, on which the literature provides informa-
tional asymmetries and commitment problems as major explanations (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010, for a review.)
Rather, it is interested in how the level of conict interacts with social identity and modernization, among others.
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Social groups are groups from which an individual chooses one group he identies with, which
are, as in Sambanis and Shayo (2013), his ethnic group and the nation N . That is, the set of social
groups for individuals of ethnic group J is fJ;Ng:
Individual i who is characterized by three types of attributes perceives how close to or far from
a social group with the distance between his attributes and average attributes of the group. The
attributes are whether one belongs to (a) the nation or not, (b) particular ethnic groups or not,
and (c) particular traditional sectors or not:
qni = 1 if i 2 N; qni = 0 otherwise, (8)
qJi = 1 if i 2 J; qJi = 0 otherwise, for J = 1; 2; ::; ne; (9)
qTJi = 1 if i 2 TJ; qTJi = 0 otherwise, for J = 1; 2; ::; ne: (10)
For example, when he belongs to ethnic group 2 and works in sector M , qni = 1; q
2
i = 1; q
J
i = 0
for J 6= 2; and qTJi = 0 for any J: The national and ethnic attributes are xed, while the sectoral
attributes are determined endogenously by sectoral choices of workers, which are described later.
The perceived distance between individual i and social group G (G = J;N), on which his utility
depends negatively, is represented by17
diG
2 = !n(q
n
i  qnG)2 + !e
neP
J=1
(qJi  qJG)2 + !s
neP
J=1
(qTJi  qTJG )2; (11)
where qnG; q
J
G; and q
TJ
G are average values of the three attributes of the group, and !n; !e; !s 2 (0; 1)
are weights on the respective attributes and their sum equals 1.
Following Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the weight on the ethnic attributes !e (the national
attribute !n) is assumed to be increasing (decreasing) in the level of ethnic conict F :18
!e = 0+1F; 0  0; 1 > 0; 0+1Fmax < 1 !s; (12)
!n = 1 !e !s = 1 !s (0+1F); (13)
where Fmax is the maximum possible level of F , whose value is determined later. The specication
implies that, when ethnic conict becomes more intense, people care about the ethnic attributes
more (the national attribute less) in measuring distances from social groups.
The utility of an individual also depends positively on the status of social group G (G = J;N)
he identies with, which is given by the di¤erence between the groups subjective "value" or
"importance" and the reference groupsone:19
17The concept of perceived distance is developed in cognitive psychology in studying how a person categorizes
information that comes in to her (stimuli) (Nosofsky, 1986). Turner et al. (1987) apply the concept to the catego-
rization by a person of people, including herself, into social groups, in constructing an inuential social psychological
theory, self-categorization theory. The theory tries to explain psychological basis of social identication.
18The weight on the sectoral attributes, !s; is assumed to be independent of F; because it is not clear how !s is
a¤ected by the intensity of ethnic conicts: if most people are in ethnically-segregated traditional sectors, !s would
probably increase with F , while if most are in the integrated modern sector, !s would decrease with F .
19 Intergroup status di¤erences are major factors a¤ecting intergroup behaviors such as conict and discrimination,
according to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), an inuential social psychological theory closely related
to self-categorization theory (footnote 17; see Turner and Reynolds, 2001, for example, for similarities and di¤erences
of the two theories), which tries to explain collective behaviors mainly based on social identity.
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SG = G    G; (14)
where exogenous G and  G summarize all factors a¤ecting the groups and the reference or
comparison groupsabsolute "value" or "importance". When G = J; the reference group is the
other ethnic groups, and when G = N; it is other nations. Since the ethnic groups are assumed to
be symmetric, SJ = J    J = 0; while SN = N    N is generally non-zero.20
The exogenous national status SN represents peoples evaluations of the nations international
standing or reputation, particularly compared to neighboring nations, in "soft" dimensions such
as culture, history, sports, and widely shared values (for example, human rights and democracy)
as well as in "hard" dimensions such as military strength and territory. In order to simplify the
analysis greatly, unlike Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the status does not depend on the groups
total material payo¤s (the sum of i) and thus is exogenous. Results would not be a¤ected by
taking into account the economic status, as long as its importance in the utility is not very large.
From these settings, as in Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the utility of individual i who identies
with social group G is given by
uiG = i   diG2 + SG; ;  > 0: (15)
The utility function implies that, given that an individual identies with a particular social
group, his utility increases as the perceived distance from the group decreases. Since the perceived
distance depends on di¤erences in the sectoral attributes, others things equal, he has an incentive
to choose the same sector as the "average person" of the group. Coordinating the choice among
group members has positive externality on each others utility.
Social identication of an individual, that is, which group he identies with, is not xed. He
can "choose" a group (his ethnic group or the nation) that brings him higher utility either because
of higher material payo¤, the shorter perceived distance, or the higher status.21 His social identity
might change if exogenous variables a¤ecting his utility directly or indirectly through choices by
others alter. For example, as the level of conict rises, individuals place a greater weight on the
ethnic attributes and a smaller weight on the national attribute in the perceived distance, which
could change their social identities.22 Exact timing of their decisions is as follows.
20The assumption on reference groups is made for simplicity. If reference groups of the nation include ethnic groups
and vice versa, SN = N   [ N + (1  )J ] ( 2 [0; 1]) and SJ = J   [ J + (1  )N ] = (1   )(J   N ):
Results in Section 3 remain the same if "SN" is replaced with "SN   SJ"(= (2   )N    N   2(1   )J ) in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 (and Appendix A).
21There is considerable evidence suggesting that perceived distance and status a¤ect social identity. For example,
Manning and Roy (2010) nd, for Great Britain, that nonwhites, whose perceived distance from the "average" person
in the nation seems to be greater, are less likely to think of themselves as British than whites. Further, they nd that
immigrants from poorer and less democratic (that is, lower status) countries assimilate faster into a British identity.
22There is evidence suggesting that social identities of individuals are a¤ected by the intensity of conict. A case
analysis of the civil war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s by Sambanis and Shayo (2013) cites evidence showing that the
share of people identifying themselves as Yugoslavs dropped greatly after the intensication of the conict and
episodes suggesting the lack of strong ethnic identities before the war. Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013), using
individual, county-level and district-level data from Uganda, nd that the proportion of individuals identifying with
their ethnic group over the nation is higher in counties of the higher intensity of armed conicts, after controlling
for individual, ethnic, and spatial characteristics and employing instrumental variable estimation. Further, Eifert,
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Timing: Individuals play a two-stage game to maximize their utility. First, they decide which
sector to work (sector TJ or sector M for individuals of ethnic group J), which in turn determines
labor incomes in traditional sectors (yTJ) and sectoral and aggregate production (YTJ ; YM ; and
Y  YTJ + YM ). Then, that is, after LTJ and LMJ are determined, they choose a social group
to identify with and the contribution to conict fi simultaneously, which determines the level of
conict F , the allocation of the contested resources V over the groups, and individual utilities.23
The solution concept applied is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, thus the two-stage game
can be solved by backward induction.24
3 Results
There exist many subgame perfect Nash equilibria for the game, including ones in which di¤erent
ethnic groups make di¤erent choices, which are generally di¢ cult to analyze. Hence, the paper
focuses on equilibria in which choices of all ethnic groups are symmetric. These equilibria can
be classied into two types, equilibria in which individuals of the same ethnic group share the
same identity and those in which they have di¤erent identities. For ease of exposition, homogenous
identity equilibria are analyzed rst (Section 3.1), then heterogenous identity equilibria are analyzed
and compared with homogenous identity equilibria (Section 3.2). These sections compare di¤erent
equilibria for given parameters and exogenous variables, but which equilibrium(a) exists do change
with values of exogenous variables. Taking into account this, Section 3.3 analyzes the main focus
of the paper, interactions among modernization (the shift from traditional sectors to the modern
sector), identity, conict, and output. And Section 3.4 examines how the abundance of contested
resources a¤ects the interactions.
In order to simplify the analysis, the following assumption, which is a su¢ cient condition for
fi > 0 and thus F > 0 to hold in all equilibria, is imposed.
Assumption 1: 
V
N
> (1)

 1

ne 1
ne
 1
 1
: (16)
3.1 Homogenous identity equilibria
There exist two homogenous identity equilibria, the equilibrium in which all individuals identify
with their ethnic group and the one in which all individuals identify with the nation. The former
Miguel, and Posner (2010), based on 22 public opinion surveys in 10 African countries, nd that being close to a
competitive presidential election is positively associated with ethnic identication.
23The timing of events reects the fact that the choice between the two sectors made earlier in life largely determines
the sector to work for most of life (because, in the real economy, the sectors tend to require di¤erent levels of education
and di¤erent types of skills and be located in di¤erent places), while social identity is more likely to change over
time, usually gradually (see footnote 21 for the evidence on immigrants), but sometimes in a short period of time
triggered by events such as armed conict and electoral competition (see footnote 22 for the evidence).
24Sambanis and Shayo (2013) apply the concept of the social identity equilibrium to their one-shot game. The
equilibrium is similar to the standard Nash equilibrium but the condition on the choice of identities is weaker. In
this paper, the concept of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is used, because it is familiar and it seems to be
easier to apply. Shayo (2009) too employs the standard Nash equilibrium to solve a one-shot game of social identity.
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is examined rst.
3.1.1 All individuals identify with their ethnic group
Consider the second stage of the game in which sectoral allocation of workers (LTJ and LMJ) are
given. When individual i of ethnic group J (J = 1; 2; :::; ne) in sector M identies with his ethnic
group, he chooses the contribution to conict fi to maximize the following utility:
AM  1

(fi)
+
FJ
F
V  !s

LTJ
N=ne
2
: (17)
From the rst-order condition,
fi=fi;e


F J
F 2
V
 1
 1
; where F JF FJ : (18)
When he is in sector TJ instead, he chooses fi to maximize
AT (LTJ)
 1  1

(fi)
+
FJ
F
V  !s

1  LTJ
N=ne
2
: (19)
The solution for fi is given by (18) as in the previous case.
Since all individuals identify with their ethnic group and the ethnic groups are symmetric, by
substituting F J = ne 1ne F and fi = F=N into (18), the equilibrium level of conict F

e is obtained:
F e =


ne 1
ne
V
N
1

N from F e =


ne 1
ne
V
F e
 1
 1
N: (20)
In the rst stage, individuals choose production sectors taking into account e¤ects of their
choices on the second stage. Assume the following condition so that LTJ = Nne (all individuals
choose sector TJ) does not hold in equilibrium.
Assumption 2: AT

N
ne
 1
+!s<AM : (21)
Then, the sectoral allocation of workers is determined so that choosing either sector is indi¤er-
ent. From (17) and (19), the indi¤erence condition is
AT (LTJ)
 1 !s

1 2neLTJ
N

=AM ; (22)
which gives the unique solution (LTJ)e 2(0; Nne ) that decreases with AM and increases with AT :25
25The rst derivative with respect to LTJ of the LHS of (22) is  (1 )AT (LTJ) 2+!s 2neN ; which equals  1 at
LTJ = 0 and equals 0 at LTJ =

(1 )AT
!s
2ne
N
 1
2 
; and the second derivative equals (2 )(1 )AT (LTJ) 3 > 0: Thus,
from (21) and the fact that the LHS of (22) at LTJ = 0 equals +1, there exists unique LTJ 2(0; Nne ) satisfying (22):
The relations of (LTJ)e with AM and AT are straightforward from the shape of the LHS of (22).
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3.1.2 All individuals identify with the nation
Consider the second stage of the game in which sectoral allocation of workers are given. When
individual i of ethnic group J in sector M identies with the nation, he chooses fi to maximize
the following utility (note !e=0+1F ):
AM  1

(fi)
+
FJ
F
V  
(
(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!s
"
LTJ
N
2
+
P
K6=J

LTK
N
2#)
+
 
N  N

: (23)
From the rst-order condition (fi>0 from the assumption (16)),
fi=fi;n


F J
F 2
V  1ne 1
ne
 1
 1
; where F JF FJ : (24)
When he is in sector TJ instead, he chooses fi to maximize
AT (LTJ)
 1 1

(fi)
+
FJ
F
V 
(
(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!s
"
1 LTJ
N
2
+
P
K6=J

LTK
N
2#)
+
 
N  N

; (25)
whose solution is given by (24) as in the previous case.
Since all individuals identify with the nation and the groups are symmetric, by plugging F J =
ne 1
ne
F and fi = F=N into (24), the equilibrium level of conict F n is obtained as a solution for
F n=

ne 1
ne


V
F n
 1
 1
 1
N: (26)
In the rst stage, the indi¤erence condition for sectoral choices equals, from (23) and (25),
AT (LTJ)
 1 !s

1 2LTJ
N

= AM ; (27)
which gives the unique solution (LTJ)n 2 (0; (LTJ)e) that decreases with AM and increases with
AT :
26
3.1.3 Analysis
The following proposition compares the two homogenous identity equilibria for given parameters
and exogenous variables in terms of the level of conict, the sectoral distribution of individuals,
and output of the private good. As explained in Section 3.3 and detailed in Appendix A, there do
exist combinations of parameters and exogenous variables such that both equilibria exist.
Proposition 1 Given parameters and exogenous variables, the following holds for two homogenous
identity equilibria.
(i) The level of conict is lower when all identify with the nation, i.e. F n < F e :
(ii) LTJ and thus the proportion of workers in traditional sectors are lower when all identify with
the nation, i.e. (LTJ)n < (LTJ)e.
26From the comparison of the LHS of (27) with that of (22) and the discussion in footnote 25, it is clear that,
when (21) is assumed, the unique solution (LTJ)n 2(0; (LTJ)e) that decreases with AM and increases with AT exists.
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(iii) Total output of the private good Y is higher under the national identity if  (the parameter of
the traditional sector production function) is below a certain level or if AM is not very high (or
AT is not very low). The output is higher under the ethnic identity if  is above a certain level
(higher than the previous threshold) and AM is high (or AT is low) enough.
Individuals contribute less to conict and thus the level of conict F is lower when they identify
with the nation, because they take into account the undesirable e¤ect of the conict on the perceived
distance from the "average member" of the nation, in choosing fi: higher F raises the weight on
ethnicity, !e; and lowers the weight on nationality, !n; thereby highlighting di¤erences among
members and raising the distance. The same result is shown in Sambanis and Shayo (2013) and is
consistent with empirical evidence such as Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) and Rohner, Thoenig,
and Zilibotti (2013) (see footnote 22).
What is new is the e¤ect on the sectoral distribution of individuals and total output. Given
parameters and exogenous variables, LTJ and thus the proportion of workers in traditional sectors
are lower when they identify with the nation. Under the national identity, the utility when they
choose the traditional sector of their ethnic group is lower for given LTJ and thus the smaller
proportion of them choose the sector, because the perceived distance from the "average national"
rises by choosing the ethnically segregated sector over the integrated modern sector, whereas, under
the ethnic identity, the perceived distance from the "average member" of the ethnic group falls (if
LTJ >
N
2ne
; i.e., the majority is in the traditional sector) or rises less (if LTJ < N2ne ).
In this model, the sectoral allocation of workers is generally ine¢ cient, i.e. it does not maximize
total output of the private good, because labor income equals the average labor productivity, not
the marginal productivity, in traditional sectors (note,  < 1, decreasing returns to labor in the
sectors) and the perceived distance distorts sectoral choices. The former leads to too many workers
in traditional sectors, while the latter leads to too few workers in the sectors under the national
identity and to too many (few) workers in the sectors under the ethnic identity when LTJ >(<) N2ne :
If  is below a certain level, the rst e¤ect dominates and LTJ is higher than the e¢ cient level.
In this case, total output is higher under the national identity because LTJ is smaller and thus
closer to the e¢ cient level. The condition would be more relevant to developing nations, since low
 implies strong decreasing returns in traditional sectors.27 The same result holds for any ; if
AM is not very high (or AT is not very low) and thus LTJ is not very small so that the second
e¤ect is positive (leads to too high LTJ) or negative but small under the ethnic identity. As shown
in the proof, this is the case if more than a quarter of workers choose traditional sectors under
the national identity, but it could be true with a much smaller proportion in the sectors. The
condition seems to hold in typical developing countries, considering the fact that a majority work
27Remember that the decreasing returns to labor intends to capture the fact that labor productivity tends to fall
with the amount of labor input in the sectors due to limited arable land (traditional agriculture), limited capital
available to credit constrained producers (the urban informal sector), or a decreasing degree of task specialization of
each family member (household production). These factors are important in developing countries.
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in the sectors (see footnote 11).28
To summarize, national identity is associated with not only the lower level of conict but also
the higher share of modern sector workers and, under conditions that would hold at least for typical
developing countries, higher levels of total output of the private good and of aggregate material
payo¤ (the value of private and public good consumption net of the cost of conict). Note that
the result on output and material payo¤ holds despite the model does not assume the plausible
negative e¤ect of conict on the modern sector productivity. The result would be strengthened if
such e¤ect is considered.29
3.2 Heterogenous identity equilibria
Now, equilibria in which individuals of the same ethnic group have di¤erent identities are examined.
There exist three heterogenous identity equilibria, the equilibrium in which sector M (sector TJ)
workers identify with the nation (their ethnic group), the one in which those in sector M are
divided over identities and all in sector TJ identify with their ethnic group, and the one in which
those in sector TJ are divided over identities (and all in sector M identify with the nation):
3.2.1 Sector TJ workers identify with their ethnic group and sector M workers iden-
tify with the nation
In the second stage of the game in which sectoral allocation of workers are given, workers in sector
TJ identifying with their ethnic group choose fi to maximize (19) and the solution is given by (18),
while those in sector M identifying with the nation choose fi to maximize (23) and the solution is
given by (24).
Because the ethnic groups are symmetric, by substituting F J = ne 1ne F into (18) and (24), and
plugging them into F = fi;eneLTJ+fi;n(N neLTJ), the level of conict F given LTJ is obtained:
F =

ne 1
ne
 1
 1
"

V
F
 1
 1
neLTJ+


V
F
 1
 1
 1
(N neLTJ)
#
; (28)
which increases with LTJ and is denoted by Fd(LTJ) (d is for "divided identities"):
In the rst stage, the indi¤erence condition for sectoral choices equals, from (18), (19), (23),
(24), and (28),
28By contrast, Y is lower under the national identity, if  is above a critical level (higher than the previous one)
and AM is high (or AT is low) enough that LTJ < N2ne , because the negative second e¤ect dominates and thus LTJ
is lower than the e¢ cient level in both equilibria. However, even in this case, unless Y is much lower, aggregate
material payo¤ would be higher under the national identity because of the lower cost of conict.
29The easiest way to include this e¤ect is to assume that AM (F); A0M (F) < 0; and individuals do not consider e¤ects
of their actions on AM (F) in making decisions. Then, only the indi¤erence conditions for sectoral choices change.
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AT (LTJ)
 1  1

 ne 1ne
V
Fd(LTJ)
 
 1 !s

1  LTJN=ne
2
=AM  1

 ne 1ne
V
Fd(LTJ)
 1 ne 1ne
 
 1 

[0+1Fd(LTJ)]
ne 1
ne
+!sne

LTJ
N
2
+
 
N  N

, AT (LTJ) 1+

[0+1Fd(LTJ)]
ne 1
ne
+!s

ne

LTJ
N
2 1 ne LTJN 2
 1

ne 1
ne
 
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 
 1 

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 
 1

  N  N =AM ; (29)
which gives the unique solution (LTJ)d2(0; Nne ); as proved in Appendix B: The equilibrium level of
conict, F d ; is obtained from the substitution of (LTJ)

d into (28).
3.2.2 Those in sector M are divided over identities and all in sectors TJ identify with
their ethnic group
In the second stage of the game, workers in sector TJ identifying with their ethnic group choose fi
to maximize (19) and the solution is given by (18), while those in sector M are indi¤erent between
identifying with the nation, in which case fi is chosen to maximize (23) and the solution is given
by (24), and identifying with their ethnic group, in which case fi is chosen to maximize (17) and
the solution is given by (18).
Thus, the indi¤erence condition for identity choices when ethnic groups are symmetric is
AM  1 (fi;e)+ FJF V  !s

LTJ
N=ne
2
= AM  1 (fi;n)+ FJF V  

(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!sne

LTJ
N
2
+
 
N  N

(30)
, 

(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
 !sne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2  1ne 1ne   1  VF  1   VF  1  1= N  N ; (31)
where F satises
F =fi;nPM;n (N neLTJ)+fi;e [neLTJ+(1 PM;n)(N neLTJ)]
=

ne 1
ne
 1
 1
 
 VF  1
 1
 1PM;n (N neLTJ)+
 
 VF
 1
 1 [neLTJ+(1 PM;n)(N neLTJ)]

; (32)
where PM;n is the proportion of sector M workers identifying with the nation. Since the LHS of
(31) decreases with LTJ and increases with F , F satisfying (31) increases with LTJ .
The indi¤erence condition for sectoral choices in the rst stage is given by (22) and thus the
same as the equilibrium in which all identify with their ethnic group from (19) and (30). Thus,
the equilibrium level of LTJ , (LTJ)Md; equals (LTJ)

e, and the equilibrium level of conict F

Md is
obtained by substituting (LTJ)e into (31) and solving it for F .
3.2.3 Those in sector TJ are divided over identities and all in sectors M identify with
the nation
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In the second stage, those in sector M identifying with the nation choose fi to maximize (23) and
the solution is (24), while those in sector TJ are indi¤erent between identifying with the nation,
in which case fi is chosen to maximize (25) and the solution is given by (24), and identifying with
their ethnic group, in which case fi is chosen to maximize (19) and the solution is given by (18).
Thus, the indi¤erence condition for identity choices when ethnic groups are symmetric is
AT (LTJ)
 1  1 (fi;e)+ FJF V  !s

1  LTJN=ne
2
= AT (LTJ)
 1  1 (fi;n)+ FJF V  

!e
ne 1
ne
+!s

1  LTJN
2
+(ne 1)

LTK
N
2
+
 
N  N

(33)
, 
h
(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!s(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
  1

ne 1
ne
 
 1
 
 VF
 
 1   VF  1  1 =  N  N ;
(34)
where F satises
F =fi;n [PTJ;nneLTJ+(N neLTJ)]+fi;e (1 PTJ;n)neLTJ
=

ne 1
ne
 1
 1
 
 VF  1
 1
 1 [PTJ;nneLTJ+(N neLTJ)]+
 
 VF
 1
 1 (1 PTJ;n)neLTJ

; (35)
where PTJ;n is the proportion of sector TJ workers identifying with the nation. F satisfying
(34) decreases with LTJ because the LHS of (34) increases with LTJ and F . After the negative
dependence of F on LTJ is taken into account, PTJ;n increases with LTJ from (35).
The indi¤erence condition for sectoral choices in the rst stage is given by (27) and thus the same
as the equilibrium in which all identify with the nation from (23) and (33). The equilibrium level
of LTJ , (LTJ)Td; equals (LTJ)

n, and the equilibrium level of conict F

Td is obtained by substituting
(LTJ)

n into (34) and solving it for F .
3.2.4 Analysis
In all the heterogenous identity equilibria, modern sector workers are more (less) likely to iden-
tify with the nation (their ethnic group) than traditional sector workers: when some workers in
traditional sectors identify with the nation, all in the modern sector do (and when some in the
modern sector identify with their ethnic group, all in traditional sectors do).30 This is because the
modern sector is ethnically integrated (and traditional sectors are ethnically segregated) and thus,
if only sectoral attributes are considered, the perceived distance of modern sector workers from
the "average national" is smaller than the distance from the "average member" of their group and
the opposite holds for traditional sector workers.31 The result is consistent with Robinson (2014),
who, using individual-level survey data of sixteen African countries, nds that being employed in
30That there do not exist equilibria in which individuals in the modern sector are less likely to identify with the
nation than those in traditional sectors is formally shown in the proof of Proposition A2 of Appendix A.
31The total perceived distance of modern sector workers from the "average national" could be greater than from the
"average member" of their ethnic group, because ethnic attributes increase the distance from the "average national".
By contrast, the total perceived distance of traditional sector workers from the "average national" is always greater
than from the "average member" of their ethnic group.
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the modern sector is signicantly and robustly associated with identifying with the nation above
their ethnic group, after controlling for education, urban residence, gender, and group-level and
country-level variables.32 ;33
The following proposition compares the heterogenous identity equilibria, together with the
homogenous identity equilibria, in terms of the level of conict, the sectoral distribution of workers,
and output of the private good, for given parameters and exogenous variables. There do exist
combinations of parameters and exogenous variables such that multiple or even all equilibria exist,
as explained in Section 3.3 and detailed in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 Given parameters and exogenous variables, the following holds when three heteroge-
nous identity equilibria, together with two homogenous identity equilibria, are compared.
(i) The level of conict is lower when the proportion of individuals identifying with the nation is
higher, i.e. F n < F Td < F

d < F

Md < F

e :
(ii) (LTJ)

Td = (LTJ)

n < (LTJ)

d < (LTJ)

Md = (LTJ)

e:
(iii) Y Td = Y

n > Y

d > Y

Md = Y

e if  is below a certain level or if AM is not very high (or AT is
not very low). The relation is opposite if  is above a certain level (larger than the previous
threshold) and AM is high (or AT is low) enough.
The level of conict is lower when the proportion of individuals identifying with the nation is
higher. That is, among the heterogenous identity equilibria, the equilibrium in which sector TJ
workers are divided over identities and all in sector M identify with the nation has the lowest
conict level, the one in which sector M workers are divided over identities and all in sector TJ
identify with their ethnic group has the highest level, and the one in which sector M (sector TJ)
workers identify with the nation (their ethnic group) has the intermediate level. Among all the
equilibria, the two homogenous identity equilibria have the highest and the lowest conict levels.
A rough explanation for the result is that individuals identifying with the national contribute
less to conict because, as explained after Proposition 1, in choosing fi, they take into account
that higher F raises the perceived distance from the "average national" by highlighting di¤erences
among ethnic groups.
The preceding explanation of the result on the conict level presumes that, among the het-
erogenous identity equilibria, the proportion of individuals identifying with the nation is highest
when those in sector TJ are divided over identities (and all in sector M identify with the nation)
and lowest when those in sector M are divided over identities (and all in sector TJ identify with
their ethnic group). The result on the fraction of workers in traditional sectors, (LTJ)Td = (LTJ)

n <
32Robinson (2014) classify workers into the formal and informal sectors based on their occupation: formal sector
occupations are military/police, clerical worker, business person, professional worker, civil servant, teacher, etc., and
informal sector occupations are subsistence farmer, informal manual labor, herder, housewife, etc.
33By contrast, Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010), based on 22 public opinion surveys in 10 African countries, nd
that being a farmer or sherman, whom they classify as traditional sector workers, is negatively correlated with the
ethnic identity. However, there is no option for the national identity in the surveys (other options are religious and
class/occupational identities) and, unlike this paper and Robinson (2014), they classify those in the urban informal
sector as formal sector workers.
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(LTJ)

d < (LTJ)

Md = (LTJ)

e, conrms that this is the case. (LTJ)

n < (LTJ)

d < (LTJ)

e holds because,
in the heterogenous identity equilibrium, the proportion of those identifying with the nation, who
gain less from choosing the traditional sector of their ethnic group, is higher (lower) than in the
equilibrium where all share the ethnic (national) identity. (LTJ)Td = (LTJ)

n and (LTJ)

Md = (LTJ)

e
hold, because individuals who share the same identity (the national identity for the former case
and the ethnic identity for the latter) are in both sectors and thus they must be indi¤erent between
the sectors as in homogenous identity equilibria.
Finally, the result on total output of the nal good is similar to Proposition 1 and can be
explained as before. The discussion on the result after Proposition 1 suggests that, for typical
developing economies, total output is generally higher as the proportion of individuals having the
national identity is higher, although Y Td = Y

n and Y

Md = Y

e are true. Further, the aggregate
material payo¤ is strictly higher when the proportion of those identifying with the nation is higher
because of the lower cost of conict.34
To summarize, the results for homogenous identity equilibria in Proposition 1 continue to hold
when heterogenous identity equilibria too are considered: national identity is associated with not
only the lower level of conict but also the higher share of modern sector workers and, under con-
ditions that would hold at least for typical developing countries, higher levels of total output of the
private good and of aggregate material payo¤ (the value of private and public good consumption
net of the cost of conict). The results are consistent with the often-made argument (for example,
Collier, 2009) that the lack of shared social identity, that is, the dominance of subnational (partic-
ularly, ethnic) identities over national identity, lies behind poor performance in various dimensions,
including conict and economic development, in ethnically heterogenous societies.
3.3 Interactions among modernization, identity, conict and output
The previous sections compared di¤erent equilibria for given parameters and exogenous variables,
but which equilibrium(a) exists changes with values of exogenous variables, as examined in detail
in Appendix A. Taking into account this result, this section analyzes the main focus of the paper,
interactions among modernization, identity, conict and output.
A simple dynamics is introduced into the model by supposing that the TFP of sector M ,
AM ; increases over time. The productivity growth raises the modern sector income, induces the
higher proportion of workers to choose the sector, i.e. lowers LTJ , and raises the sectors share
in production. How does modernization driven by the productivity growth a¤ect social identity,
conict, and aggregate output?35 The next proposition, based on the propositions in Appendix
34The total cost of conict is (Nn and Ne are respectively numbers of those identifying with the nation and their
ethnic group) 1


(fi;n)
Nn +(fi;e)
Ne

= 1


(fi;n)
 1fi;nNn+(fi;e) 1fi;eNe

= 1

ne 1
ne
 
 V
F
 1

fi;nNn+
V
F
fi;eNe

=
1

ne 1
ne
[V  1fi;nNn] ; where the second equality is from the rst order conditions of utility maximization and
F J = ne 1ne F: The total cost decreases with Nn since fi;n increases with Nn from (24) and Proposition 2.
35Note that modernization is not the same as urbanization: traditional sectors correspond to the urban informal
sector as well as traditional agriculture and household production in the real economy. Many developing countries
experienced rapid urbanization without signicant modernization.
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A, shows that the e¤ect di¤ers depending on the status of the nation SN :36 Note that changes in
other exogenous variables including a decrease in contested resources V have similar e¤ects to an
increase in SN ; as shown in Propositions 4 and 5:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the TFP of sector M , AM ; increases over time. Then,
(i) If the status of the nation SN is very high (very low), all individuals always identify with the
nation (their ethnic group) and the level of conict F is consistently low (high):
(ii) Otherwise, when SN is relatively high (low), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous
identity equilibrium to the one in which all individuals identify with the nation (their ethnic
group): Given parameters and exogenous variables including SN ; multiple equilibria tend to exist
and thus social identity, conict, and output di¤er depending on which equilibrium is realized.
(iii) For given AM , when SN is relatively high (low), the society tends to be in an equilibrium with
low (high) F and LTJ and, under conditions that would hold for typical developing countries, a
high (low) level of aggregate output of the nal good Y (and aggregate material payo¤):
If the status of the nation SN is at extremes, the society stays in the same equilibrium: when
the status is very high (very low), all individuals always identify with the nation (their ethnic
group) and the level of conict F is consistently low (high):
Otherwise, when SN is relatively high (low), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous
identity equilibrium, in which traditional sector workers are more likely to identify with their
ethnic group than modern sector workers, to the equilibrium in which all individuals identify with
the nation (their ethnic group) and the level of conict is low (high). The sectoral shift of workers
associated with modernization shakes social identities in both sectors: modern sector workers
become less attached to the national identity and traditional sector workers become less attached
to the ethnic identity. When SN is relatively high (low), it is usually the case that the e¤ect on
traditional (modern) sector workers determines the equilibrium shift and all become identied with
the nation (their group). Although the increase of AM always lowers LTJ and raises the modern
sectors share in production, for given AM , the society tends to be in an equilibrium characterized
by large (small) modern sector shares in employment and production and, under conditions that
would hold for typical developing nations, high (low) aggregate output of the nal good Y (and
aggregate material payo¤); when SN is high (low). That is, having su¢ ciently high national status
is crucial in achieving universal national identity, a low level of conict, high modern sector shares
(a high degree of modernization), and high aggregate output in the long run.
However, history or "luck" too is important, as long as the status is not at extremes. Given
parameters and exogenous variables including SN ; multiple equilibria tend to exist and thus social
identity, conict, and output di¤er depending on which equilibrium is realized.37 (This is the reason
36As mentioned in footnote 20, when reference groups of the nation (an ethnic group) include ethnic groups (the
nation) as well as other nations (ethnic groups) in the measure of the national status SN (the status of ethnic group
J , SJ ), results in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 (and Appendix A) remain the same if "SN" is replaced with "SN   SJ".
37 In the model of Sambanis and Shyao (2013) too, multiple equilibria exist when the status is not at extremes.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium when 1 = 0
for "tends to" in the statements of (ii) and (iii) of the proposition.) Suppose that an equilibrium
realized initially is maintained in subsequent periods, if the equilibrium continues to exist. Then, if
the initial equilibrium happens to be such that a relatively high proportion of individuals identify
with the nation, the society tends to be in an equilibrium with relatively strong national identity
and relatively good conditions in terms of the level of conict, modern sector shares, and aggregate
output subsequently. This is particularly so when the status is at intermediate level, in which case
multiple equilibria exist even in the long run (i.e., when AM is high).
The result would be understood more easily, rst by looking at the result when 1 = 0, that is,
when weights on ethnic attributes !e and on the national attribute !n of the perceived distance do
not depend on the level of conict F . In this case, F is the same in all equilibria and equilibrium
is unique given parameters and exogenous variables. Figure 1 illustrates how the realized equilib-
rium di¤ers depending on SN and LTJ ; when 1 = 0: As AM increases over time, LTJ decreases,
whose value is determined by the indi¤erence condition for the sectoral choice of the corresponding
equilibrium. Thus, the society moves leftward with the productivity growth in the gure.
When the status of the nation is very high (very low), all individuals always identify with
the nation (their ethnic group). By contrast, when the status is neither very high nor very low,
the realized equilibrium changes with the productivity growth. When the status is relatively high
(low), the society shifts from the equilibrium in which sector M workers identify with the nation
and sector TJ workers identify with their ethnic group to the equilibrium in which all identify
with the nation (their ethnic group). That is, the social identity initially associated with modern
(traditional) sector workers becomes the shared identity eventually, when the status is high (low).
The growth of AM raises the modern sector income and induces the higher proportion of workers
to choose the sector. As a result, modern sector workers become less attached to the national
identity (the di¤erence in their utilities under the national identity and under the ethnic identity
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falls), because the greater proportion of their ethnic group are in the sector and thus the perceived
distance under the ethnic identity falls more than under the national identity,38 while traditional
sector workers become less attached to the ethnic identity, because the smaller proportion of their
group are in the sector. That is, the sectoral shift of labor associated with modernization shakes
long-standing identities in both sectors. When the national status is high, the latter e¤ect on
traditional sector workers determines the equilibrium shift (because utilities under the national
identity are relatively high and thus the "identity shock" of modern sector workers are less severe)
and all become identied with the nation, while when the status is low, the former e¤ect on modern
sector workers determines the shift and all become identied with their ethnic group.
When 1 > 0, that is, when the weight on !e increases and the one on !n decreases with F ,
F is lower in an equilibrium with the higher proportion of individuals identifying with the nation
(Propositions 1 and 2). Further, multiple equilibria could exist given parameters and exogenous
variables and the two equilibria in which workers in one of the sectors are divided over identities
could exist. Multiple equilibria could arise because of two-way positive causations between conict
and ethnic identity: when the level of conict is high (low), people care about ethnicity more (less)
in measuring the distance from social groups and thus they are more (less) likely to identify with
their ethnic group, whereas when the proportion of those identifying with their ethnic group is
high (low), the level of conict is high (low). The two heterogenous identity equilibria could exist
because conict depends on social identity when 1 > 0: workers in one of the sectors can be
indi¤erent between the identities in equilibrium, only if their identity choice a¤ects F and thus
utilities under the identities (note that (31) and (34) do not hold when 1 = 0).
Figure 2 illustrates how the realized equilibrium(a) di¤ers depending on SN and LTJ when
1 > 0; based on Propositions A1 and A2 in Appendix A.39 The equilibrium in which all identify
with the nation (their ethnic group) exists in the region above the upward-sloping solid curve (on
or below the downward-sloping solid curve). The equilibrium in which sector TJ workers identify
with their ethnic group and sector M workers identify with the nation exists in the region with
triple-dashed double-dotted lines (the lower borderline is not included), the one in which those in
sector M are divided over identities and all in sectors TJ identify with their ethnic group exists in
the region with negatively-sloped lines (both borderlines are not included), and the one in which
those in sectors TJ are divided over identities and all in sector M identify with the nation exists
in the region with positively-sloped lines (both borderlines are not included).
Suppose, for example, that the society starts with the equilibrium in which sector TJ workers
identify with their ethnic group and sector M workers identify with the nation. As long as it stays
in this equilibrium, with the growth of AM , LTJ and thus the proportion of individuals identifying
with their ethnic group decrease, which results in a fall in the level of conict, the increased share of
38The perceived distance of modern sector workers falls under either identity but the fall under the ethnic identity
is greater, because changes in the average sectoral attributes are greater.
39The gure is for the case when !s is relatively high and 1 is relatively low. Appendix A presents a gure when
!s is relatively low and 1 is relatively high (Figure 5). Although relative positions of several curves are di¤erent,
basic features of the gure are similar to this one.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium when 1 > 0
the modern sector, and higher aggregate output and material payo¤.40 ;41 However, this equilibrium
ceases to exist and thus the society shifts to another equilibrium eventually. As the gure shows,
if SN is relatively high (low), it shifts to the equilibrium in which all individuals identify with the
nation (their ethnic group) and the level of conict falls (rises), where the rise of F when SN is
low may be interpreted as a rise in non-violent conict such as rent-seeking activities, if it occurs
at low LTJ .42 The sectoral shift and output growth continue, but given AM , LTJ is lower, and the
share of the modern sector, output, and material payo¤ are higher in the equilibrium of universal
national identity.
The gure shows that there are several regions in which multiple equilibria exist. The two
equilibria in which workers in one of the sectors are divided over identities exist only in such
regions. Suppose, for example, that the society starts with the region in which the following three
equilibria   the equilibrium in which sector TJ workers identify with their ethnic group and sector
M workers identify with the nation, the one in which all identify with their ethnic group, and the
one in which sector M workers are divided over identities (and all in sectors TJ identify with their
group)   exist. Depending on which equilibrium happens to be realized initially, social identity, the
level of conict, sectoral composition, and aggregate output in subsequent periods di¤er; clearly
the outcome is worst when the society starts with the equilibrium in which all identify with their
40As mentioned above, it is supposed that an equilibrium realized initially is maintained in subsequent periods if
the equilibrium continues to exist.
41Actually, it is also possible that the proportion of individuals identifying with their ethnic group and the conict
level increase over time while LTJ is relatively high. This is the case when the society is in the equilibrium in which
those in sector TJ are divided over identities and all in sectors M identify with the nation. As mentioned just after
(35), the proportion of those in sector TJ identifying with their ethnic group increases with a decrease in LTJ :
42The equilibrium shift changes F discontinuously, while it changes LTJ continuously.
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ethnic group. Further, when SN is such that multiple equilibria exist even when LTJ is low, the
long-run outcome of the society starting with the equilibrium in which identity di¤ers by sectors
varies greatly depending on to which equilibrium the society happens to shift : the best (worst) is
the shift to the one in which all identify with the nation (their ethnic group).
3.3.1 Discussion
As mentioned in Introduction, there exist competing theses on e¤ects of modernization on social
identity in political science. The traditional thesis, which is based on the past experience of Europe,
argues that modernization leads to widespread national identity at the expense of ethnic and other
subnational identities (Deutsch, 1953; Weber, 1979; Gellner, 1983), while another inuential thesis
mainly focusing on Africa argues that modernization rather breeds ethnic identication (Melson
and Wolpe, 1970; Bates, 1983).
The proposition shows that, when the status of the nation is relatively high (low), eventually,
the society tends to shift from a heterogenous identity equilibrium to the one in which all individuals
identify with the nation (their ethnic group) characterized by a low (high) level of conict. Thus,
as far as the relatively long term e¤ect of modernization (the e¤ect involving the equilibrium shift)
is concerned, the result is consistent with the traditional view when the status is relatively high,
while it is consistent with the competing view when it is relatively low.
Robinson (2014), using cross-sectional individual-level survey data of sixteen African nations,
nds that, when Tanzania is excluded from the sample, GDP per capita is signicantly and posi-
tively related to identifying with the nation above their ethnic group, after controlling for various
individual-level (such as formal sector employment), group-level and country-level variables. She
interprets the evidence as suggesting that modernization (higher GDP per capita) leads to national
identity. The evidence may be considered as capturing the relatively short term e¤ect in an econ-
omy with a low degree of modernization, considering the fact that it is based on cross-sectional
data of mostly poor African nations. Indeed, the e¤ect of the productivity growth under a given
equilibrium is consistent with her interpretation, when SN is not at extremes and LTJ is su¢ -
ciently high that the society is in a heterogenous identity equilibrium, except the one where sector
TJ workers are divided over identities, in which case the e¤ect is negative (see Figure 2).43
However, both social identity and the degree of modernization for given modern sector produc-
tivity are endogenously determined in the model, thus her evidence can also partially be explained
by the story that national identity and modernization are positively related through positive ef-
fects of the national status on them. Further, the evidence can partly be explained by multiple
equilibria too, because national identity and modernization are positively related among di¤erent
equilibria (for given parameters and exogenous variables). In order to distinguish the di¤erent sto-
ries empirically, it is important to estimate regression models with enough control variables using
43 In the equilibrium in which sector TJ workers are divided over identities, F increases with a decrease in LTJ
from (34). Then, the number of those identifying with their ethnic group, (1 PTJ;n)neLTJ ; increases with a decrease
in LTJ from (35).
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longitudinal data, although such data is not available at this point. Analysis using longitudinal
data is also called for examining the relatively long term e¤ect of modernization empirically.
The proposition also shows that multiple equilibria exist and the outcome depends on history
or "luck" when the national status is not at extremes. As Sambanis and Shayo (2013) stress, this is
consistent with the empirical nding that countries similar in ethnic diversity, geography, economic
conditions, and political institutions have diverse histories regarding levels of ethnic conict.
What are policy implications of the result that having su¢ ciently high national status is crucial
in achieving the good outcome? The national status represents peoples evaluations of its interna-
tional standing or reputation, particularly compared to neighboring nations, in "soft" dimensions
such as culture, history, sports, and widely shared values (for example, human rights and democ-
racy) as well as in "hard" dimensions such as military strength and territory. Clearly, policies can
a¤ect some of the dimensions. Miguel (2004) and Collier (2009), based on case study and statistical
analysis, argue that "nation-building" policies, including the promotion of a national language and
school education emphasizing common history, culture, and values, are e¤ective in strengthening
national identity. The result shows how these policies can reinforce national identity through rais-
ing the national status and suggests that they are critical for the good outcome in countries where
the status is low because of lack of shared culture and history, such as many African nations.
Alternatively, these "nation-building" policies may be interpreted as policies making shared
nationality more salient, i.e. raising !n, and ethnicity less salient, i.e. reducing !e; in the perceived
distance. Indeed, the following proposition shows that a decrease in 0 that raises !n and lowers
!e has similar e¤ects to an increase in SN : (Note that !e = 0+1F and !n = 1 !s  (0+1F):)
Proposition 4 Suppose that AM increases over time. Then, results similar to Proposition 3 hold
for 0 when "high (low) SN" is replaced with "low (high) 0". Specically, when 0 is low (high),
the society tends to shift from a heterogenous identity equilibrium to the one in which all individuals
identify with the nation (their ethnic group); given other things equal.
Graphically, this result holds because all the dividing lines of Figure 2 shift downward when 0
decreases.
Empirical importance of "nation-building" policies on social identity seems to be supported.
Miguel (2004) bases his argument on ndings from comparison of Tanzania and Kenya, which
largely shared geography, history, and colonial institutional legacy, but conducted sharply di¤erent
ethnic policies after independence in areas such as national language and public school education
and exhibits large di¤erences in the strength of national identity. Robinson (2014) nds that
the relation between modernization and national identity becomes insignicant once Tanzania is
included into the sample because the national identity of Tanzania is "too strong" for given levels
of control variables. More direct evidence is obtained for a developed country: Clots-Figueras and
Masella (2013) examine e¤ects of the introduction of a bilingual (Catalan and Spanish) education
system in Catalonia using survey data and nd that the number of years exposed to the bilingual
system is positively related to the strength of Catalan identity and the propensity to vote for a
party with a Catalanist platform.
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3.4 E¤ects of contested resources
Finally, e¤ects of the amount of contested resources V are examined. Specically, how does it
a¤ect the level of conict F and how does it inuence the e¤ects of the productivity growth on
identity, conict, and development? The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 5 (i) The level of conict F increases with resources V in all equilibria.
(ii) Suppose that the TFP of sector M , AM ; increases over time. Then, results similar to Proposi-
tion 3 hold for V when "low (high) SN" is replaced with "large (small) V ". Specically, when
V is large (small), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous identity equilibrium to the one
in which all individuals identify with their ethnic group (the nation).
The rst result, which is consistent with many empirical studies on armed internal conict such
as Collier and Hoe­ er (2004) and Ross (2006), is standard and intuitive: as the amount of contested
resources increases, people contribute more to conict and thus the conict level increases.
The second result states that similar results to Proposition 3 hold for resources V , when "low
(high) SN" of the proposition is replaced with "large (small) V ". Specically, given the national
status, when the amount of resources is large (small), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous
identity equilibrium to the equilibrium in which all individuals identify with their ethnic group (the
nation) with the productivity growth of the modern sector. That is, the abundance of resources is
an impediment for the society to achieve universal national identity, a low level of conict, a high
share of the modern sector, and high aggregate output. Remember that the contested resources
represent both material resources (such as natural resources) and a part of the governmental budget
for group-specic club goods whose allocation over the groups is determined by the consequences
of violent conict or non-violent conict (such as rent-seeking activities). Hence, the result shows
that weak political and economic institutions as well as the abundance of material resources is a
hindrance to the desirable outcome. The result is consistent with the traditional thesis on e¤ects
of modernization on social identity if contested resources are not abundant or institutions are good
in quality, otherwise it is consistent with the competing thesis, as far as the relatively long term
e¤ect of modernization is concerned.
Graphically, the result holds because all the dividing lines of Figure 2 shift upward when V
increases. When the amount of contested resources increases, the level of conict rises in all
equilibria and thus people care about ethnicity more, i.e. !e increases, (nationality less, i.e. !n
decreases) in measuring perceived distances from social groups. Given the national status, this
makes identifying with their ethnic group relatively more attractive compared to identifying with
the nation.
Consistent with the result, Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) nd negative e¤ects of natural
resources on economic development when institutions are weak. Empirical works also suggest that
political and economic institutions have important e¤ects on civil conict (Renyal-Querol, 2002),
rent-seeking activities (Easterly, 2001), and development (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004).
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The above result reveals a novel mechanism interacting with social identity that resources and
institutions a¤ect ethnic conict and development.
4 Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that ethnic divisions or diversity in a society leads to negative outcomes
in various dimensions, including civil conict and economic development. It is often argued that the
lack of shared social identity, that is, the dominance of subnational (particularly, ethnic) identities
over national identity, lies behind the negative outcomes in ethnically heterogenous societies. If
shared national identity is important, how can it be realized? In political science, there exist
conicting theses emphasizing e¤ects of modernization on national identity, the traditional thesis
claiming the positive e¤ect and the competing one claiming the negative e¤ect. Which thesis is
more relevant under what conditions? How are conict and output a¤ected by modernization
through identity? How do policies such as "nation-building" policies a¤ect the outcome?
In order to examine these questions theoretically, this paper has developed a model of social
identity, ethnic conict, and development. In the model, individuals choose a sector to work
(between the modern sector and a traditional sector), social identity (between ethnic identity and
national identity), and contributions to ethnic conict. Thus, modernization (and output), identity,
and conict interact with each other.
It has been found that, given other things equal, a society with higher national status, less
contested resources, better institutions, or ethnic di¤erences less salient in peoples minds tends
to be in an equilibrium with the higher proportion of individuals with the national identity, the
lower level of conict, the higher share of modern sector workers (higher degree of modernization),
and higher output. Simple dynamic analysis has shown that, as modernization proceeds, a society
tends to shift to an equilibrium with uniformly national identity and the good outcome in other
dimensions, if the status is high, the resources are not abundant, institutions are good in quality,
or ethnic di¤erences are not salient in peoples minds; otherwise, it tends to shift to an equilibrium
with uniformly ethnic identity and the worse outcome in other dimensions. Hence, the model is
consistent with the traditional (competing) thesis on e¤ects of modernization on identity under the
former (latter) situation, as far as the relatively long term e¤ect is concerned. When the national
status is low or ethnic di¤erences are salient in peoples minds, "nation-building" policies, such as
the promotion of a national language and school education emphasizing common history, culture,
and values, are crucial for the good outcome. The model has shown how they can reinforce national
identity through raising the national status or making shared nationality more salient. The model
has also revealed a novel mechanism interacting with social identity that resources and institutions
a¤ect ethnic conict and development.
27
References
[1] Akerlof, G. A. and R. E. Kranton (2000), "Economics and Identity, " Quarterly Journal of
Economics 115 (3): 715-53.
[2] Akerlof, G. A. and R. E. Kranton (2010), Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our
Work, Wages, and Well-Being, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
[3] Banerjee, A. and A. Newman (1998), "Information, the dual economy, and development,"
Review of Economic Studies 65, 63153.
[4] Bates, R. (1983), "Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Con-
temporary Africa." In State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. D. Rothchild
and V. A. Olorunsola. London, UK: Westview Press, 152 171.
[5] Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2011), "Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs as assets," Quarterly
Journal of Economics 126 (2): 805 855.
[6] Besley, T. and T. Persson (2010), "State Capacity, Conict, and Development," Econometrica
78 (1): 134.
[7] Besley, T. and T. Persson (2011), "The Logic of Political Violence," Quarterly Journal of
Economics 126 (3), 14111446.
[8] Bisin, A., E. Patacchini, T. Verdier, and Y. Zenou (2011), "Formation and persistence of
oppositional identities," European Economic Review 55(8), 10461071.
[9] Blattman, C. and E. Miguel (2010), "Civil War", Journal of Economic Literature 48 (1), 357.
[10] Caselli, F. and W. J. Coleman II (2013),On the Theory of Ethnic Conict, Journal of the
European Economic Association 11(S1): 161192.
[11] Clots-Figueras, I. and P. Masella (2013), "Education, Language and Identity," Economic Jour-
nal 123, F332F357.
[12] Collier, P. (2009), Wars, Guns, and Votes. New York, NY: Harper Perennial.
[13] Collier, P. and A. Hoe­ er (2004), Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Oxford Economic
Papers 56, 563595.
[14] Davidson, B. (1992), The Black Mans Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State.
Oxford, UK: James Currey Publishers.
[15] Deutsch, K. W. (1953), Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Founda-
tions of Nationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[16] Easterly, W. (2001) "Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conict?" Economic Development and
Cultural Change 49(4), 687 706.
[17] Eifert, B., E. Miguel, and D. N. Posner (2010), "Political Competition and Ethnic Identication
in Africa," American Journal of Political Science 54(2): 494510.
[18] Esteban, J. and D. Ray (2008), On the Salience of Ethnic Conict.American Economic
Review 98 (5): 2185202.
28
[19] Esteban, J. and D. Ray (2011), "Linking Conict to Inequality and Polarization," American
Economic Review 101 (4): 13451374.
[20] Esteban, J., L. Mayoral, and D. Ray (2012), "Ethnicity and Conict: An Empirical Study,"
American Economic Review 102(4): 1310 42.
[21] Garnkel, M. R. (1990), Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium,
American Economic Review 80(1): 5068.
[22] Gellner, E. (1983), Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
[23] Hirshleifer, J. (1989), Conict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs. Di¤erence
Models of Relative Success,Public Choice 63(2): 10112.
[24] Kedourie, Elie, ed. (1970), Nationalism in Asia and Africa. New York, NY: New American
Library.
[25] Lewis, A. W. (1954), "Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour," Manchester
School of Economic and Social Studies 22 (2), 139191.
[26] Manning, A., and S. Roy (2010), Culture Clash or Culture Club? National Identity in
Britain,Economic Journal 120: F72F100.
[27] Mehlum, H., K. Moene, and R. Torvik (2006) "Institutions and the Resource Curse," Economic
Journal, 116(508): 1 20.
[28] Melson, R. and H. Wolpe (1970), "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theo-
retical Perspective," American Political Science Review 64(4): 1112 1130.
[29] Miguel, E. (2004), Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya Versus
Tanzania,World Politics 56: 32762.
[30] Miguel, E. and M. K. Gugerty (2005), Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods
in Kenya,Journal of Public Economics 89 (11-12): 2325 68.
[31] Montalvo, J. G. and M. Reynal-Quero (2005), "Ethnic diversity and economic development,"
Journal of Development Economics 76 (2): 293 323.
[32] Nosofsky, R. M. (1986), Attention, Similarity and the Identication-Categorization Relation-
ship,Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 115 (1): 3957.
[33] OECD (2009), Is Informal Normal? Towards More and Better Jobs, OECD, Paris.
[34] Proto, E. (2007), "Land and the transition from a dual to a modern economy," Journal of
Development Economics 83, 88 108.
[35] Renyal-Querol, M. (2002) "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars," Journal of Conict
Resolution 46 (1), 29 54.
[36] Robinson, A. L. (2014), "National Versus Ethnic Identication in Africa: Modernization, Colo-
nial Legacy, and the Origins of territorial Nationalism," World Politics 66, 709746.
[37] Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian, and F. Trebbi (2004) Institutions Rule: The Primacy of In-
stitutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,Journal of Economic
Growth 9 (2), 131 165.
29
[38] Rohner, D., M. Thoenig, and F. Zilibotti (2013), "Seeds of distrust: conict in Uganda",
Journal of Economic Growth 18: 217252.
[39] Ross, M. L. (2006) A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War, Annual Review of
Political Science, 9: 265 300.
[40] Sambanis, N. and M. Shayo (2013), "Social Identication and Ethnic Conict," American
Political Science Review 107 (2): 294325.
[41] Shayo, M. (2009), A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy:
Nation, Class and Redistribution,American Political Science Review 103 (2): 14774.
[42] Skaperdas, S. (1992), Cooperation, Conict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights,
American Economic Review 82(4): 72039.
[43] Tajfel, H. and J. C. Turner (1986), "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior." In S.
Worchel and W. Austin eds., Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Chicago: Nelson Hall, 724.
[44] Turner, J. C., M. Hogg, P. Oakes, S. Reicher, and M. Wetherell (1987), Rediscovering the
Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
[45] Turner, J. C. and K. H. Reynolds (2001), "The Social Identity Perspective in Intergroup
Relations: Theories, Themes, and Controversies." In Brown, R. and S. L. Gaertner, eds.,
Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup processes 3 (1): 133152.
[46] Vollrath, D. (2009), "The dual economy in long-run development," Journal of Economic
Growth 14, 287-312.
[47] Weber, E. (1979), Peasants into Frenchmen : The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
[48] Yuki, K. (2007), "Urbanization, informal sector, and development," Journal of Development
Economics 84, 76103.
[49] Yuki, K. (2008), "Sectoral shift, wealth distribution, and development," Macroeconomic Dy-
namics 12, 527559.
[50] Yuki, K. (2014), "Education, Inequality, and Development in a Dual Economy,"Macroeconomic
Dynamics, forthcoming.
Appendix A Existence conditions of equilibria
This Appendix presents precise conditions (combinations of parameters and exogenous variables)
under which each equilibrium exists. The propositions in this Appendix are the basis for Proposi-
tions 3 5 and Figures 1 and 2 in Section 3.
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Figure 3: Proposition A1
A.1 Homogenous identity equilibria
The next proposition presents the existence conditions for the two homogenous identity equilib-
ria. In the proposition, d2[F;cs] 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Proposition A1 (i) The equilibrium in which all individuals identify with their ethnic group exists
for any LTJ when SN  d2
h
F e ; ne 1ne
i
 c(F e ); and for LTJ 2 [0; (LTJ)yy] when 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; where LTJ=(LTJ)e is the solution for (22)
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(ii) The equilibrium in which all identify with the nation exists for any LTJ when SN >d2
h
F n ;
ne 1
ne
i
 
c(F n); and for LTJ 2 [0; (LTJ)]]) when 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where LTJ=(LTJ)n is the solution for (27) and (LTJ)]] is the one for d2
h
F n ;(ne 1) (LTJ)
]]
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2 ne (LTJ)
]]
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Based on the proposition, Figure 3 illustrates combinations of LTJ and SN under which the
homogenous identity equilibria exist. In the gure, the equilibrium in which all identify with the
nation exists in the region above the upward-sloping curve and the one in which all identify with
their ethnic group exists in the region on or below the downward-sloping curve. That is, given
LTJ , the former (latter) equilibrium tends to exist when SN is high (low), and given SN ; the two
equilibria tend to exist when LTJ is low, where LTJ is determined by the indi¤erence condition
for sectoral choices of the corresponding equilibrium. Note that both equilibria exist in the region
with slant lines.
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A.2 Heterogenous identity equilibria
The next proposition presents the existence conditions for the three heterogenous identity equilibria.
Proposition A2 (i) The equilibrium in which workers in sectors TJ identify with their ethnic
group and those in sectorM identify with the nation exists i¤ d2

Fd(LTJ); (ne 1)ne

LTJ
N
2 
c(Fd(LTJ))<SN  d2
h
Fd(LTJ);(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
 c(Fd(LTJ)); where Fd(LTJ) is the
solution for (28) and increases with LTJ and LTJ = (LTJ)d is the solution for (29).
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(ii) The equilibrium in which those in sector M are divided over identities and all in sectors TJ
identify with their ethnic group exists i¤ d2
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N
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(iii) The equilibrium in which those in sectors TJ are divided over identities and all in sectorM iden-
tify with the nation exists for LTJ 2((LTJ)]; (LTJ)]]) when SN 2
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Based on the proposition, Figure 4 illustrates combinations of LTJ and SN under which each
equilibrium including the homogenous identity equilibria exists when !s (the weight on sectoral
attributes in the perceived distance) is relatively high and 1 (the strength of the e¤ect of F on the
weights on ethnic and national attributes) is relatively low.46 The equilibrium in which workers in
sectors TJ identify with their ethnic group and those in sector M identify with the nation exists in
44To be more detailed, the equilibrium exists for LTJ 2 [(LTJ)]; Nne ] when
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46To be more accurate, this is the case when 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Figure 4: Proposition A2 when !s is relatively high and 1 is relatively low
the region with triple-dashed double-dotted lines (the lower borderline is not included), the one in
which those in sector M are divided over identities and all in sectors TJ identify with their ethnic
group exists in the region with negatively-sloped lines (both borderlines are not included), and the
one in which those in sectors TJ are divided over identities and all in sector M identify with the
nation exists in the region with positively-sloped lines (both borderlines are not included). As in
Figure 3, the equilibrium in which all identify with the nation (their ethnic group) exists in the
region above the upward-sloping solid curve (on or below the downward-sloping solid curve).
Given LTJ (which is determined by the indi¤erence condition for sectoral choices of the corre-
sponding equilibrium), the heterogenous identity equilibria tend to exist when SN is neither very
high nor very low, and given SN ; the equilibrium in which those in sectors TJ identify with their
ethnic group and those in sector M identify with the nation tends to exist when LTJ is large. Note
that there are several regions in which multiple equilibria exist. In particular, the two equilibria in
which workers in one of the sectors are divided over identities exist only in such regions. All ve
equilibria exist in the small triangular region on the left side of the gure.
Figure 5 illustrates combinations of LTJ and SN under which each equilibrium exists when !s
is relatively low and 1 is relatively high. Unlike Figure 4, the value of SN at the intersection of
the downward-sloping solid curve with LTJ = 0 is greater than the one at the intersection of the
upward-sloping solid curve with LTJ = neN , and the value of SN at the intersection of the bottom
dotted curve with LTJ = 0 is smaller than the one at the intersection of the curve with LTJ = neN :
However, basic features of the gure are similar to the previous one.
(downward-sloping) solid curve with LTJ = Nne (LTJ = 0), and d
2[F n ; 0] c(F n) (d2
h
F e ; ne 1ne
i
 c(F e ))
is the value of SN at the intersection of the bottom dotted curve with LTJ = 0 (LTJ = Nne ). The LHS of the last
inequality increases with !s, while the RHS can be shown to increase with 1:
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Figure 5: Proposition A2 when !s is relatively low and 1 is relatively high
Appendix B Proofs
Proof of the uniqueness of (LTJ)d. The derivative of the LHS of (29) with respect to LTJ equals
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where, from (28),
F 0d(LTJ) =

ne 1
ne
 1
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 1
 1 

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 1
 1

ne
1+ 1 1
V
(Fd(LTJ))2

ne 1
ne
 1
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 1
 1 1
neLTJ+

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 1
 1 1
(N neLTJ)
 :
(37)
The second derivative of the LHS of (29) with respect to LTJ equals
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Since, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2 (iii), the LHS of (29) is always lower than that of
(22), (LTJ)d < (LTJ)

e holds. Thus, the derivative of the LHS of (22) for LTJ  (LTJ)d is negative,
that is,  (1 )AT (LTJ) 2+2!s neN < 0: From this inequality, the rst part of (38) is positive for
LTJ  (LTJ)d; since it is greater than (1 )AT (LTJ) 3

(2 ) LTJ ne 1N

> 0:
The second part of (38) is positive at LTJ  (LTJ)d when  = 2; because the second part of (36)
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which clearly increases with LTJ : Hence, the second derivative of the LHS of (29) is positive for
LTJ  (LTJ)d and thus (LTJ)d is unique (remember that the LHS of (29) is always lower than that
of (22) whose solution is unique (LTJ)e). This also proves that the rst derivative of the LHS is
negative for LTJ  (LTJ)d:
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Straightforward from (20) and (26). (ii) Shown in footnotes 25 and
26.
(iii) Denote total output of the private good in the equilibrium in which all individuals identify
with the nation (their ethnic group) by Y n (Y e ). From (1) and (2),
Y n > Y
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Since (LTJ)e > (LTJ)n; the above condition holds when AM is not very high or AT is not very low
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when (LTJ)n is much lower than
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parameters and exogenous variables are such that (LTJ)n(LTJ)e (LTJ)n; then the inequality holds
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from LTJ=

AT
AM
 1
1 
> 1:
Because (43) holds as !0, does not hold as !1; and the rst derivative of the LHS of the
equation is  1 as !0; and it increases as  goes up, there exists a 2(0; 1); which depends on
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exogenous variables and parameters, below which (LTJ)n > LTJ and thus Y

n > Y

e hold.
By contrast, Y n < Y e holds if
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From a similar reasoning as above, if LTJ=
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< N2ne , there exists a 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which (LTJ)e < LTJ and thus Y
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e hold. (Or, from (42), if parameters and exogenous variables
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Proof of Proposition 2. (i) F n < F Td is from (26) and (32), F

Md < F

e is from (20) and (35),
and F Td < F
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d < F
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Md shown in (ii).
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e are shown in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. As shown in
footnote 25, the LHS of (22), the indi¤erence condition whose solution is (LTJ)e, decreases with
LTJ for LTJ  (LTJ)e:
Hence, given parameters and exogenous variables, (LTJ)d < (LTJ)
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where the inequality holds from (87) in the proof of Proposition A2.
As shown in footnote 26, the shape of the LHS of (27), the indi¤erence condition whose solution
is (LTJ)n, is similar to that of (22). Hence, (LTJ)d > (LTJ)
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n holds if the LHS of (29) is greater than
that of (27) at LTJ = (LTJ)d; which is true because
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where the inequality holds from (88) in the proof of Proposition A2.
(iii) Denote total output of the private good in the equilibrium in which those in sector M
(sectors TJ) identify with the nation (their ethnic group) by Y d . From (1) and (2),
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1CA(LTJ)d > 0; (53)
where the third equation is from (27) and (29).
Since (LTJ)d>(LTJ)

n from (ii) of the proposition and the second term is non-negative from the
equilibrium condition (88) in the proof of Proposition A2 (i); the above inequality holds when AM
is low enough or AT is high enough that 2N ((LTJ)

d+(LTJ)

n) 1 > 4N (LTJ)n 1  0 is true, although
the condition could hold even when (LTJ)n is much lower than
N
4 if the second term is large.
From (1) and (2),
Y e < Y

d , AT ((LTJ)e) AM (LTJ)e < AT ((LTJ)d) AM (LTJ)d (54)
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1CCA(LTJ)d < 0; (56)
where the third equation is from (22) and (29).
Since (LTJ)d < (LTJ)

e from (ii) of the proposition and the second term is negative from the
equilibrium condition (87) in the proof of Proposition A2 (i); the above inequality holds when
AM is low enough or AT is high enough that 2neN ((LTJ)

d+(LTJ)

e) 1 > 4neN (LTJ)d 1  0 is true,
although the condition could hold even when (LTJ)d is much lower than
N
4ne
if the second term is
large negative.
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As for the result on the relationship between  and the magnitude relation of Y d and Y

n or Y

e ;
the corresponding proof of Proposition 1 applies since (LTJ)e > (LTJ)d > (LTJ)

n holds (although the
condition for Y d > Y

e when  is su¢ ciently low and the one for Y

d > Y

n when  is su¢ ciently
high could be strengthened). Y Td = Y

n and Y

Md = Y

e are straightforward from (LTJ)

Td = (LTJ)

n
and (LTJ)Md = (LTJ)

e:
Proof of Proposition 4. It is enough to prove that the terms on the opposite side of 
 
N  N

of all equilibrium conditions  the LHSs of (72) and (83) in the proof of Proposition A1 and of
(87) and (88) in the proof of Proposition A2  increase with 0 (that is, all dividing lines in Figure
2 shift upward with an increase in 0). As for the homogeneous identity equilibria, since F is
independent of 0; the result is straightforward from (72) and (83). As for the equilibrium in which
those in sector T identify with their ethnic group and those in sector M identify with the nation,
since F is independent of 0 for given LTJ from (28); the result is straightforward from (87) and
(88). (Each term of the conditions of the remaining equilibria are same as one of these terms.)
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Straightforward from the equation determining F of each equilibrium,
(20), (26), (28), (29), (31), and (34).
(ii) It is enough to prove that the terms on the opposite side of 
 
N  N

of all equilibrium
conditions  the LHSs of (72) and (83) in the proof of Proposition A1 and of (87) and (88) in the
proof of Proposition A2  increase with V (that is, all dividing lines in Figure 2 shift upward with
an increase in V ).
[The equilibrium in which all identify with their ethnic group] The derivative of the LHS of
(72) in the proof of Proposition A1 with respect to V is, from (20),
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 1

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 
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
= 1 (V )
 1 ne 1
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F e

1  1N  VF e

: (57)
For F e =

 ne 1ne
V
F e
 1
 1
N and F n =
h
ne 1
ne

 VF n
 1
i 1
 1
N not to be very similar, 1 must be of a
similar order of magnitude to  VF n and 
V
F e
: Then, 1  1N  VF e > 0 and thus the above derivative
is positive.
[The equilibrium in which all identify with the nation] Since dF

n
dV =
1
 1 

 1 
V
Fn 1
and
d( V
Fn )
dV =
1
Fn

 V
Fn 1


 1 
V
Fn 1
from (26), the derivative of the LHS of (83) with respect to V is,
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[The equilibrium in which those in sector T identify with their ethnic group and those in sector
M identify with the nation] From (28),
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Thus, the derivative of the LHS of (87) or (88) with respect to V is,
1
 1
1
Fd(LTJ)

ne 1
ne
 
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 1
 1 1
neLTJ+

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 1
 1 1
(N neLTJ)

1+ 1 1
V
[Fd(LTJ)]2

ne 1
ne
 1
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 1
 1 1
neLTJ+

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 1
 1 1
(N neLTJ)


2641 

 VFd(LTJ)
 1
 1 

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 1
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 1
 1 1
neLTJ+

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 1
 1 1
(N neLTJ)
375 ; (61)
where the expression inside the large square bracket is greater than
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 1
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(Each term of the equilibrium condition of the remaining equilibria are same as one of the above
terms.)
Proof of Proposition A1. (i) The equilibrium in which all individuals identify with their ethnic
group:
[Sector M ] The utility of individual i of ethnic group J in sector M equals, from (17) and (18),
AM  1

(fi;e)
+
FJ
F
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LTJ
N=ne
2
: (63)
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If he deviates and identies with the nation, the highest utility he gets is
AM  1
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[(fi;n)
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F 0
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where (fi;n)0 =
h
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F J
(F 0)2V  1 ne 1ne
i 1
 1
, not (fi;n)0 = 0, from the assumption (16), (FJ)0 = (fi;n)0+
N
ne
 1

fi;e; and F 0=(FJ)0+F J .
When N is large enough, the deviation by one player a¤ects aggregate values (FJ)
0 and F 0
very little, thus the above equation is approximated very well by the following equation that is
marginally larger than the original one
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Thus, the deviation is not protable if
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[Sector TJ ] The utility of individual i of ethnic group J in sector TJ is, from (19) and (18),
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If he deviates and identies with the nation, the highest utility is well approximated by
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The deviation is not protable if
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[The equilibrium condition] From this equation and (67), if the condition for the modern sector
holds, so does the one for the traditional sector. Hence, (67) is the condition for the existence of
the equilibrium when LTJ is the solution for the indi¤erence condition (22). Since ethnic groups
are symmetric and thus values of aggregate variables of all groups are the same, (67) becomes
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where F e is given by (20), and d2[] ;c(); and SN are as dened just before the proposition.
The condition holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when 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d2
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N
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SN :
(ii) The equilibrium in which all individuals identify with the nation:
[Sector TJ ] The utility of individual i of ethnic group J in sector TJ is, from (25) and (24),
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If he deviates and identies with his ethnic group, the highest utility he gets is
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When N is large enough, the deviation by one player a¤ects aggregate values (FJ)
00
and (F )
00
very little, thus the above equation is approximated very well by the following equation that is
marginally smaller than the original one
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The deviation is not protable if47
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[Sector M ] The utility of individual i of ethnic group J in sector M equals, from (23) and (24),
47The equation must hold with strict inequality because the deviants approximate utility is marginally smaller
than the true utility.
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If he deviates and identies with his ethnic group, the highest utility is well approximated by
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The deviation is not protable if
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[The equilibrium condition] From this equation and (78), if the condition for sector TJ holds,
so does the one for sector M . Hence, (78) is the condition for the existence of this equilibrium
when LTJ is the solution for the indi¤erence condition (27). Since ethnic groups are symmetric ,
(78) becomes
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where F n is the solution for (26).
The above inequality holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when 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Proof of Proposition A2. [The proof that no other heterogenous identity equilibria exist] If
workers in sector M weakly prefer to identify with their ethnic group, from (67), the following
must hold in a symmetric equilibrium:
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If workers in sector TJ weakly prefer to identify with the nation, from (78), the following must
hold in a symmetric equilibrium:
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Both conditions cannot hold simultaneously and thus such situations do not arise in equilibrium.
(i) The equilibrium in which workers in sector T identify with their ethnic group and those in
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sector M identify with the nation:
[Sector M ] Because workers in sector M identify with the nation, the condition for them not
to deviate from the equilibrium is given by (82) as in the equilibrium in which all identify with the
nation.
In the symmetric equilibrium, the equation becomes
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where Fd(LTJ) is the solution for (28) and increases with LTJ :
The relation between the LHS of the equation and LTJ is ambiguous, but the relation is positive
for small LTJ because the derivative of the LHS at LTJ = 0 is positive.
[Sector TJ ] Because workers in sector TJ identify with their ethnic group, the condition for
them not to deviate from the equilibrium is given by (71) as in the equilibrium in which all identify
with their group.
In the symmetric equilibrium, the equation becomes
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where the LHS increases with LTJ from (28).
Thus, the condition holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when SN  d2[F n ; 0] c(F n); and for
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[The equilibrium condition] Hence, the equilibrium exists i¤ 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To be more detailed, the equilibrium exists for LTJ 2 [(LTJ)]; Nne ] when
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(ii) The equilibrium in which those in sector M are divided over their identities and all in
sectors TJ identify with their ethnic group:
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[Sector M ] As shown in Section 3.2.2, the following indi¤erence condition for identity choices
of sector M workers must hold


(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
 !sne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2  1ne 1ne   1  VF  1   VF  1  1= N  N ; (31)
where F satises
F =

ne 1
ne
 1
 1
 
 VF  1
 1
 1PM;n (N neLTJ)+
 
 VF
 1
 1 [neLTJ+(1 PM;n)(N neLTJ)]

: (32)
Given LTJ ; the LHS of (31) increases with F and F satisfying (32) decreases with PM;n: Hence,
F and PM;n satisfying both equations exist i¤


(0+1Fd(LTJ))
ne 1
ne
 !sne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2  1ne 1ne  1 1 VFd(LTJ)  1  VFd(LTJ)F  1  1

< 
 
N  N

< 

(0+1F

e )
ne 1
ne
 !sne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2  1ne 1ne  1 1 VF e   1  VF e  1  1

;
(90)
where F e is given by (20) and Fd(LTJ) is given by (28) and increases with LTJ :
The second inequality of (90) holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when SN <d2
h
F e ; ne 1ne
i
 c(F e );
and for LTJ 2 [0; (LTJ)yy) when SN 2
h
d2
h
F e ; ne 1ne
i
 c(F e ); d2[F e ; 0] c(F e )

; where
(LTJ)
yy is LTJ satisfying d2

F e ; ne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2 c(F e )=SN :
The LHS of the rst inequality is same as (29) in (i), thus the relation between the LHS and
LTJ is positive for small LTJ but generally ambiguous.
[Sector TJ ] Because workers in sector TJ identify with their ethnic group, the condition for
them not to deviate from the equilibrium is given by (82) as in the equilibrium in which all identify
with their ethnic group. In the symmetric equilibrium, the condition becomes

h
(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!s(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
  1

 ne 1ne
V
F
 
 1 

 ne 1ne
V
F  1 ne 1ne
 
 1

 N  N ;
(91)
where F is the solution for (31) and (32). When (90) and thus (31) hold, this condition holds for
certain.
[The equilibrium condition] Hence, the equilibrium exists i¤ d2

Fd(LTJ); (ne 1)ne

LTJ
N
2 
c(Fd(LTJ))<SN <d
2

F e ; ne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2 c(F e ); where Fd(LTJ) is the solution for (28)
and increases with LTJ and LTJ = (LTJ)e is the solution for (22).
To be more detailed, the equilibrium exists for LTJ 2 [0; (LTJ)yy) when
SN2

max
LTJ

d2

Fd(LTJ); (ne 1)ne

LTJ
N
2 c(Fd(LTJ)); d2[F e ; 0] c(F e ) and for LTJ<
minf(LTJ)yy; Nne g satisfying d2

Fd(LTJ); (ne 1)ne

LTJ
N
2 c(Fd(LTJ))<SN when SN2
min
LTJ
n
d2[F n ; 0] c(F n); d2
h
F e ; ne 1ne
i
 c(F e )
o
;max
LTJ

d2

Fd(LTJ); (ne 1)ne

LTJ
N
2 c(Fd(LTJ));
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where (LTJ)yy is LTJ satisfying d2

F e ; ne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2 c(F e )=SN :
(iii) The equilibrium in which those in sectors TJ are divided over their identities and all in
sector M identify with the nation:
[Sector TJ ] As shown in Section 3.2.3, the following indi¤erence condition for identity choices
of sector TJ workers must hold

h
(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!s(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
  1

ne 1
ne
 
 1
 
 VF
 
 1   VF  1  1= N  N ;
(34)
where F satises
F =

ne 1
ne
 1
 1
 
 VF  1
 1
 1 [PTJ;nneLTJ+(N neLTJ)]+
 
 VF
 1
 1 (1 PTJ;n)neLTJ

: (35)
Given LTJ ; the LHS of (34) increases with F; and F satisfying (35) decreases with PTJ;n: Hence,
F and PTJ;n satisfying both equations exist i¤

h
(0+1F

n)
ne 1
ne
+!s(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
  1

ne 1
ne
 
 1

 VF n
 
 1 

 VF n
 1
 
 1

< 
 
N  N

< 
h
(0+1Fd(LTJ))
ne 1
ne
+!s(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
  1

ne 1
ne
 
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 
 1 

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 
 1

;
(92)
where F n is given by (26) and Fd(LTJ) is given by (28) and increases with LTJ :
Thus, the rst inequality of (92) holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when SN > d2
h
F n ;
ne 1
ne
i
 
c(F n); and holds for LTJ 2 [0; (LTJ)]]) when SN 2

d2[F n ; 0] c(F n); d2
h
F n ;
ne 1
ne
i
 c(F n)
i
;
where (LTJ)]] is LTJ satisfying d2
h
F n ;(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
 c(F n)=SN :
The second inequality of (92) holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when SN < d2[F n ; 0] c(F n);
and for LTJ 2 ((LTJ)]; Nne ] when SN 2
h
d2[F n ; 0] c(F n); d2
h
F e ;
ne 1
ne
i
 c(F e )

; where
(LTJ)
] ((LTJ)]<(LTJ)]] from F n < Fd(LTJ)) is LTJ satisfying d2
h
Fd(LTJ);(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
 
c(Fd(LTJ))=SN :
[Sector M ] Because workers in sector M identify with the nation, the condition for them not
to deviate from the equilibrium is given by (82) as in the equilibrium in which all identify with the
nation. In the symmetric equilibrium, the condition becomes


(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
 !sne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2  1ne 1ne   1  VF  1   VF  1  1< N  N ; (93)
where F is the solution for (34) and (35). When (92) and thus (34) hold, this condition holds for
certain.
[The equilibrium condition] Hence, when LTJ is the solution for (27); the equilibrium exists for
LTJ 2((LTJ)]; (LTJ)]]) when SN 2

d2[F n ; 0] c(F n); d2
h
F n ;
ne 1
ne
i
 c(F n)
i
; and exists for
LTJ 2((LTJ)]; Nne ] when SN 2

d2[F n ;
ne 1
ne
] c(F n); d2
h
F e ;
ne 1
ne
i
 c(F e )

:
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